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Gregory Bateson presents a challenging subject for biographers and historians.  He was 
famously sceptical of the conventional ideas of mind and self that serve as the foundation stones 
of biography yet at the same time the shape of his life is all too well known.  The son of the 
pioneer geneticist, William Bateson, he abandoned an early enthusiasm for natural history in 
favour of anthropology.  Supported by his Cambridge tutor, A. C. Haddon, he carried out 
fieldwork, first among the Baining and Sulka peoples of New Britain and then more rewardingly 
among the Iatmul tribe of Papua New Guinea.  Here, he met and fell in love with Margaret Mead,  
and would soon take on and share her enthusiasm for a culturalist approach in anthropology.  
Following the example of Ruth Benedict and Franz Boas they strove to overcome the lazy 
ethnocentrism that had characterised early studies of indigenous peoples , attempting instead 
to judge their subjects’ belief and actions on their own terms.  
Bateson’s newfound commitment to cultural relativism was reinforced by an Anglo-Saxon 
scepticism toward the working concepts of philosophy and natural science: a scepticism drawn 
from the writings of Samuel Butler, Bertrand Russell , Alfred North Whitehead and R. G. 
Collingwood. As a result his one major work of ethnography, Naven (1936),  ostensibly a study of 
Iatmul (a kind of carnivalesque kinship ritual), became an exercise in anthropological self-
critique.  In an attempt to overcome the fallacy of ‘misplaced concreteness’ that turned the 
working categories of early twentieth-century ethnological investigation into social facts, 
Bateson elaborated a new tentative vocabulary built up from loan words and neologisms such as 
‘ethos’, ‘eidos’ and ‘schismogenesis’, to explore how the categories groups lived by were the 
contingent and practical outcome of dynamic social relationships.  An attempt to explain Iatmul 
ritual became, instead, a meditation on the nature of explanation.  The defining feature of all 
Bateson’s investigations - from his anthropological fieldwork to his post war research on 
schizophrenic behaviour and dolphin communication - was his insistence that these subjects 
serve to illuminate the unacknowledged assumptions that organise our own patterns of thought.  
The great strength of Bateson’s approach, with its emphasis on the mutability of concepts, was 
that it opened itself up to reinvention.  By the 1950s, Naven could be read as a prototypical 
exercise in systems theory.  Bateson and Mead were both drawn towards cybernetics, 
participating in the early Macy Conferences.  Bateson found in the new science a potent means 
for understanding the process of abstraction, seeing in the shifting levels of information 
exchange (from signal to sign to context) a parallel to the different levels of interaction he had 
tried to map out in his study of Iatmul culture.  From the 1940s onwards, Bateson combined this 
idea of orders of communication with a keen awareness of the ways that signals could feed back 
and feed forwards to create vicious circles of repetitive behaviour or open up new patterns of 
learning and new levels of perspective.  It is this Bateson, committed to an ongoing critique of 
mindless mechanism and aware of how everyday frustrations might drive us toward a 
transcendental awareness, that appears as the hero of Chaney’s Runaway. 
For much of Runaway, Bateson appears as a kind of countercultural guru, performing before 
cross-legged audiences of uncomprehending beatniks as he attempts to apply communications 
theory to the analysis of the cold war’s cultural malaise.  Bateson appears at the Two Worlds 
Conference in Sacramento in 1966 and, more famously, with Allen Ginsberg at the Dialectics of 
Liberation Conference organised by the radical psychiatrists, R. D. Laing and David Cooper at 
the Camden Roundhouse in 1967.  In front of these audiences, Bateson’s investigations into 
levels of meaning and abstraction were reframed as call to radical action.  As he made clear: 
“the Question is not what is the best thing to do within the rules as they are  at the moment.  The 
question is how can we get away from the rules from within which we have been 
operating.” (Chaney, 154).   Bateson’s long years of fieldwork with alien forms of communication 
(in anthropology, psychiatry and animal training) held out the promise that one could escape the 
cold war samsara of constant closed loops of repetitive behaviour.  In its place he offered an 
ecological vision of consciousness in which the individual recognised the contingent and 
mutable nature of the games they were playing and the materials they played them.  
Parts of this story are familiar, John Brockman and Andy Pickering have both already offered 
detailed readings of the radical impact of Bateson’s thought, and his philosophy has received 
more detailed reconstructions (in excellent works by David Lipset and Peter Harries-Jones),  
Chaney however brings something new to these discussions through his pursuit of the rather 
Batesonian strategy of drawing readers’ attention to the multiple contexts that sustained 
Bateson’s ideas.  Whereas other authors have looked to Wiener and Mead as formative 
influences, BJHS readers will probably be pleased to discover in Chaney’s work a careful 
emphasis on Bateson’s interest in Lamarckism; partly ‘inherited’ from his father but reworked 
through correspondence with the historians of science, William Coleman and Charles Coulton 
Gillispie.  The Lamarck fashioned in these conversations was an individual who had redescribed 
the universe: it was no longer an ordered hierarchy but a shifting assemblage driven by change 
from below.  There were no fixed points. As with the universe so with the mind.  As Bateson told 
his audience at the Roundhouse: “I am inclined to regard the total systemic creature, you see, as 
mind, and the total systemic ecology as mind, and the culture as mind”  (218)  It’s a point of view 
which explodes the possibility of biography, allowing many different biographies to be told at 
many different levels.  And its point of view which encourages reflexivity.  Writing to Coleman in 
the early 1960s, Bateson agreed that the the history of science is only superficially guided by 
scientific research and disciplined thinking.  “Behind this superficial facade”, he claimed, “there is 
always, a ‘heaving mass of inchoate mysticism which scientific figures never put into 
words’”(115) He recalled how as a student at Trinity he had been shown Newton’s ‘alchemistic 
manuscripts, deistic tracts and other occult materials’ locked up in a ‘big wooden box’ and 
asked, rhetorically, ‘Do historians have no such boxes?’ They clearly do, and it is to Chaney’s 
credit that he makes no attempt to disguise to his commitment to Bateson’s vision of an 
ecological consciousness and to the political reformation that would be won through its 
acceptance.  His approach and Bateson’s arguments remain provocative, calling into question 
the assumption of a fixed context that is usually evoked to ground socio-historical narratives.  As 
Bateson and Chaney make clear, fixing a context is as much an achievement as fixing an identity.   
This is not a definitive Bateson biography, and it certainly won’t be the final word on Bateson, 
but Chaney’s achievement is to show how this provisionality is a strength.  
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